lov-output
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-confirmed content for file storage, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. However, the skill implements robust mitigation strategies.
- Ingestion points: Content enters the agent context through natural language requests to save confirmed text, as defined in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdworkflow step 4 explicitly instructs the agent to maintain the source text's facts and original meaning, avoiding any additions or summaries that could be influenced by injected instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to local file-write operations and read-back verification.
- Sanitization:
SKILL.mdworkflow step 3 mandates the use of correct serializers for structured data and explicitly requires protection against CSV formula injection. - [SAFE]: The profile management script (
scripts/profile_store.py) includes a security filter to prevent the storage of sensitive information such as tokens or passwords in the user profile, adhering to safe data handling practices. - [SAFE]: Instructions in
SKILL.mdspecify that destructive actions (modifications, deployments, or releases) must only be performed under explicit user request, ensuring the agent remains under user control. - [SAFE]: The code uses
yaml.safe_loadfor parsing YAML files in the validation script, preventing potential arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities during deserialization.
Audit Metadata