lov-png2svg
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to construct and run several shell commands includingmagick,vtracer,svgo, andrm. These commands rely on variables likeINPUT_PNGandOUTPUT_SVGthat are derived from user input or the local environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface where untrusted data (filenames/paths) is used to build executable command strings. An attacker could potentially achieve command execution by providing a filename containing shell metacharacters.
- Ingestion points: The
INPUT_PNGandOUTPUT_SVGvariables inSKILL.mdwhich are sourced from user requests or local file names. - Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters or specify that the agent should treat the paths as literals or use shell-safe escaping.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute arbitrary subprocesses through the shell, including image manipulation and file deletion commands in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent; the instructions do not include steps to validate, escape, or sanitize the input variables before they are placed in a bash execution context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and requires the installation of several external software packages from well-known and reputable sources.
- Mentions installation of
imagemagickthrough the Homebrew package manager. - Mentions installation of
vtracervia the Cargo package registry for Rust. - Mentions installation and execution of
svgovia the NPM package registry.
Audit Metadata