skills/lovstudio/skills/lov-png2svg/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lov-png2svg

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md direct the agent to construct and run several shell commands including magick, vtracer, svgo, and rm. These commands rely on variables like INPUT_PNG and OUTPUT_SVG that are derived from user input or the local environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface where untrusted data (filenames/paths) is used to build executable command strings. An attacker could potentially achieve command execution by providing a filename containing shell metacharacters.
  • Ingestion points: The INPUT_PNG and OUTPUT_SVG variables in SKILL.md which are sourced from user requests or local file names.
  • Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters or specify that the agent should treat the paths as literals or use shell-safe escaping.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute arbitrary subprocesses through the shell, including image manipulation and file deletion commands in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the instructions do not include steps to validate, escape, or sanitize the input variables before they are placed in a bash execution context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and requires the installation of several external software packages from well-known and reputable sources.
  • Mentions installation of imagemagick through the Homebrew package manager.
  • Mentions installation of vtracer via the Cargo package registry for Rust.
  • Mentions installation and execution of svgo via the NPM package registry.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 18, 2026, 04:34 PM