lov-release-via-cicd
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automated elevation of GitHub repository security settings. The skill uses
gh apito setdefault_workflow_permissionstowriteand enables PR approval permissions for the repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive automation of git and GitHub CLI operations including
git add,git commit,git push, andgh workflow run. These automate the full release cycle, including the execution of remote CI/CD pipelines. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides workflow templates that rely on several third-party GitHub Actions such as
softprops/action-gh-release,changesets/action, andtauri-apps/tauri-actionfor handling releases and build environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Includes instructions and templates requiring elevated system privileges, such as
sudo apt-getfor dependency installation andsudo xattrfor modifying macOS file quarantine attributes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection via project metadata processing:
- Ingestion points: Reads
CHANGELOG.md, branch names, and git commit messages from the repository environment. - Boundary markers: Uses
awkto extract version-specific sections based on header patterns, but lacks explicit markers to prevent following embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: Wide range of capabilities including file system writes, git operations, and repository management via
ghCLI. - Sanitization: Relies on basic text splitting (regex/awk) without rigorous validation of external content.
Audit Metadata