lov-rename-project

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/rename_project.py uses the subprocess.run function to execute Git commands and the GitHub CLI (gh). The tool implements security controls by validating the target project name against a restrictive regular expression (^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$), which effectively prevents shell command injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external project files, which constitutes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Files are read from the local project root in scripts/rename_project.py to generate a rename plan.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not currently use specific delimiters to wrap content read from files when presenting the plan to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities and the ability to execute Git and GitHub CLI commands through subprocesses.
  • Sanitization: While command arguments are validated, the textual content read from project files is not sanitized, as the tool's purpose is literal string replacement.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The utility scripts/profile_store.py manages persistent user configuration in standard local directories (e.g., ~/.config/agent-skills). It includes a security filter that explicitly rejects attempts to store sensitive keys such as tokens, secrets, or passwords within the profile records.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 09:49 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lov-rename-project