lov-rename-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/rename_project.pyuses thesubprocess.runfunction to execute Git commands and the GitHub CLI (gh). The tool implements security controls by validating the target project name against a restrictive regular expression (^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$), which effectively prevents shell command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external project files, which constitutes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Files are read from the local project root in
scripts/rename_project.pyto generate a rename plan. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently use specific delimiters to wrap content read from files when presenting the plan to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities and the ability to execute Git and GitHub CLI commands through subprocesses.
- Sanitization: While command arguments are validated, the textual content read from project files is not sanitized, as the tool's purpose is literal string replacement.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The utility
scripts/profile_store.pymanages persistent user configuration in standard local directories (e.g.,~/.config/agent-skills). It includes a security filter that explicitly rejects attempts to store sensitive keys such as tokens, secrets, or passwords within the profile records.
Audit Metadata