lov-search-chat
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests historical conversation data from a local
ataruindex. Since this content is user-generated or agent-generated, it could potentially contain malicious prompts (indirect prompt injection) that attempt to manipulate the current agent's behavior when the content is read into the context. - Ingestion points:
scripts/ataru_recall.pyreads JSON output from theatarubinary'ssearchandreadsubcommands inscripts/ataru_recall.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently use specific delimiters (e.g., XML tags or special tokens) to separate recalled chat snippets from its own instructions, although the instructions in
SKILL.mdtell the agent to cite sources. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute local shell commands (via
subprocess.runinscripts/ataru_recall.py) and write to a local profile JSON file (viascripts/profile_store.py). - Sanitization:
ataru_recall.pymitigates large data influx by projecting only essential fields and truncating snippets to 600 characters and messages to 2000 characters by default. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local binary (
ataruorlovcode) to perform its search operations. - The
scripts/ataru_recall.pyscript usessubprocess.runwith list-based arguments, avoiding shell interpolation risks. - It includes a
normalize_argvhelper to safely handle project identifiers that begin with hyphens, preventing them from being misinterpreted as command-line flags. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
README.mdprovides installation commands that fetch the skill and its components from thelovstudiovendor repositories usingnpx. This represents the standard distribution method for the vendor's own tools.
Audit Metadata