lov-xbti-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to automate environment setup and project scaffolding. Actions include runningnode,git,npx,pip, andpython3commands to check for and install dependencies, clone repositories, and execute internal scripts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs several external fetch and install operations:
- Clones a template repository from
https://example.com/skills/XBTI.gitusinggit clone. - Installs the
image-creatorskill usingnpx skills add image-creator -g -y. - Installs Python packages
google-genaiandPillowviapip install, specifically attempting to bypass system restrictions using--break-system-packages. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: User-provided inputs for "BTI名称" (Name), "主题" (Theme), and "风格偏好" (Tone) via
AskUserQuestion(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; user inputs are interpolated into generation prompts without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including file writing (
Write,Edit), network access (git clone), and system-level command execution (Bash). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of user-provided theme strings is described before they are used to generate content and dimension systems.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves dynamic code and data handling:
- Uses
node -ein Step 9 to execute a one-liner script that merges multiple JavaScript data files into acase.jsonfile. - Programmatically generates JavaScript files (
dimensions.js,questions.js,types.js) which are subsequently incorporated into the project's runtime environment.
Audit Metadata