lov-xbti-gallery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from external repositories, including case names and descriptions, to build a gallery view. This data ingestion creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the metadata of an external repository.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads metadata from the
casesdirectory of specified repositories (documented in SKILL.md, Workflow step 3). - Boundary markers: The execution boundary explicitly limits the scope of actions, stating that analysis and preview requests remain read-only.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
ghCLI for listing repository contents and a Python script (profile_store.py) for managing local configuration fields. - Sanitization: The workflow restricts output to specific fields (name, description, entrance URL) and prohibits the creation of new tests or submission of cases.
Audit Metadata