docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and process injection. The script
scripts/office/soffice.pywrites embedded C source code to the filesystem, compiles it at runtime usinggcc, and then loads the resulting library into thesofficeprocess usingLD_PRELOADto hook system calls. Additionally,scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically generates StarBasic macros to automate document modifications through LibreOffice.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts within the skill utilize thesubprocessmodule to execute system-level utilities. These include the invocation ofgccfor compilation,gitfor comparing document content, andsofficefor document format conversion and processing.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation inSKILL.mddirects the user to perform an unversioned global installation of thedocxlibrary from the npm registry (npm install -g docx), which introduces an external dependency and supply chain risk at the time of skill configuration.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of untrusted external document data and its high-privilege system capabilities.\n - Ingestion points: The scripts
scripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/office/pack.pyprocess data from ZIP archives and constituent XML files within.docxdocuments.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or delimiters are used to isolate untrusted document content from the agent's control instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive system access through shell execution, compiler invocation, and filesystem operations across multiple scripts.\n
- Sanitization: While the skill uses
defusedxmlto mitigate some XML-based attacks, it does not sanitize document content before it influences the behavior of system-level utilities.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata