project-migration

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include high-privilege commands, specifically sudo rm -rf ~/.devcontainer-state, which poses a risk of unauthorized or accidental data deletion.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The configuration requirements include mounting sensitive host directories (~/.ssh and ~/.aws) directly into the development container, creating a significant risk of credential exposure or theft.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches configuration state and blueprints from external GitHub repositories such as git@github.com:loxosceles/devcontainer-state.git and loxosceles/project-blueprints.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses npx to dynamically download and execute skills and tools (e.g., npx skills add loxosceles/ai-dev) during the migration process.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes existing, potentially untrusted project files, establishing an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads and audits existing project files, including .devcontainer/ configs, linting files, and package.json (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore malicious content within project files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive shell execution capabilities including git, mkdir, npx, and pnpm, as well as the ability to modify project structure (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of existing project content is specified before processing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 3, 2026, 02:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — project-migration