skills/lua2147/claude-toolkit-catalog/linkdrop-x-0x-kaize-awesome-claude-code-repos/Gen Agent Trust Hub
linkdrop-x-0x-kaize-awesome-claude-code-repos
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow allows for the installation of arbitrary third-party code. Step 5 instructs the agent to copy patterns from cloned community repositories into the local skill directory (
~/.claude/skills/). This results in the potential execution of unverifiable code from untrusted sources once integrated into the agent's environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs several network operations to fetch external content from untrusted sources.
- Uses
gh apito fetch and base64-decode the README from thehesreallyhim/awesome-claude-coderepository. - Uses
gh repo cloneto download entire repositories from arbitrary GitHub users based on findings in the community list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on complex shell command chains to manage remote resources and process external data.
- Uses
bashto execute local security scripts on downloaded content. - Uses
grep,xargs, andfindto scan downloaded code for network-related keywords likecurl,wget, ornc. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Fetches the community README via GitHub API (Step 2).
- Boundary markers: None present to distinguish instructions from the fetched README content.
- Capability inventory: Full Bash access,
ghCLI usage, and file system write access to skill directories. - Sanitization: Relies on external scripts (
check-secrets.sh,check-gbrain-ban.sh) that are not provided within the skill itself, making the sanitization unverifiable.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata