mundi-orch-counterparty-enrich
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly reads from
~/Mundi Princeps/config/api_keys.json, which contains credentials for LSEG, Orbis, and A-Leads. Exposing raw secret files to the agent context is a high-risk pattern for accidental disclosure or misuse. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing local shell scripts, specifically
apps/pitchbook-mcp/scripts/refresh-pb-cookies.sh. This execution occurs in an environment where the agent also hasWriteandEditpermissions, meaning the agent could potentially modify these scripts before execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its pipeline design.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested via
mcp__perplexity__perplexity_research(web grounding) and external financial APIs (PitchBook, CapIQ). - Boundary markers: None are defined; there are no instructions for the agent to ignore or delimit embedded commands within the fetched dossiers or news articles.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including
Bashaccess, file systemWrite/Edit, and arbitrary SQL execution viamcp__supabase__execute_sql. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content before it is processed or written to the final dossiers.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata