terraform-stacks
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides automation scripts in
references/api-monitoring.mdthat access the sensitive local Terraform credentials file at~/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.jsonto extract API tokens for authentication with HashiCorp's official platform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute various
terraform stacksCLI commands for infrastructure management and provide shell scripts utilizingcurlandjqto interact with external APIs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and documentation reference the use of Terraform providers and modules sourced from public registries and private registries hosted on the
app.terraform.iodomain. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits metadata poisoning and attack surface vulnerabilities for indirect injection:
- The YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mdcontains a copyright notice attributed to "IBM Corp", which contradicts the designated skill author "Lua2147". This deceptive metadata may lead users or systems to misattribute the skill's origin and safety. - The skill is designed to process and act upon user-supplied HCL configuration files, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Terraform configuration files (
.tfcomponent.hcl,.tfdeploy.hcl) located at the repository root. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables shell command execution, network requests, and access to local credential files.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on the external
terraformbinary for syntax and schema validation of processed files.
Audit Metadata