terraform-stacks

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides automation scripts in references/api-monitoring.md that access the sensitive local Terraform credentials file at ~/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json to extract API tokens for authentication with HashiCorp's official platform.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute various terraform stacks CLI commands for infrastructure management and provide shell scripts utilizing curl and jq to interact with external APIs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and documentation reference the use of Terraform providers and modules sourced from public registries and private registries hosted on the app.terraform.io domain.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits metadata poisoning and attack surface vulnerabilities for indirect injection:
  • The YAML frontmatter in SKILL.md contains a copyright notice attributed to "IBM Corp", which contradicts the designated skill author "Lua2147". This deceptive metadata may lead users or systems to misattribute the skill's origin and safety.
  • The skill is designed to process and act upon user-supplied HCL configuration files, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Terraform configuration files (.tfcomponent.hcl, .tfdeploy.hcl) located at the repository root.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables shell command execution, network requests, and access to local credential files.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on the external terraform binary for syntax and schema validation of processed files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 12:54 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — terraform-stacks