deep-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources including public code repositories (via Sourcebot), third-party library documentation (via Context7), and general web research/debugging information (via Perplexity).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the output of search and documentation retrieval tools.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or warnings to treat external content as untrusted, which increases the risk of the agent following instructions embedded in the retrieved research data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to architectural analysis and refactoring tools (mcp__zen__*) and local codebase search.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping the retrieved external content before it is processed or included in the final report.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions use aggressive, authoritative language and negative constraints to override the agent's default decision-making and enforce a specific workflow and model choice.
- Evidence: Phrases such as 'CRITICAL ENFORCEMENT', 'YOU MUST ALWAYS', 'NO EXCEPTIONS', 'MANDATORY', and 'YOUR TASK WILL BE INVALIDATED' are used to ensure strict adherence to the defined research steps.
- Model Override: The skill explicitly mandates the use of a specific model ('anthropic/claude-opus-4.6') for certain tool calls, overriding the agent's default model selection logic.
Audit Metadata