openspec-to-beads

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and interpret data from multiple external files (proposal.md, tasks.md, spec.md, design.md) within the openspec/changes/ directory. These files represent untrusted ingestion points where an attacker could embed malicious instructions aimed at influencing the agent's behavior during the conversion process.
  • Ingestion points: openspec/changes/<change>/proposal.md, openspec/changes/<change>/tasks.md, openspec/changes/<change>/specs/*/spec.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the planning artifacts.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (bd create, bd dep add, openspec show).
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation of the content extracted from these files before it is used to generate tasks or summary reports.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell templates to create issues in the Beads system. In templates/issue-creation.md, values parsed from the external files are interpolated directly into shell commands, such as bd create "[<change>] <category>: <task-description>". If the task descriptions or category names in the source files contain unescaped shell characters (specifically double quotes), it could result in command injection on the host system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 11:48 PM