using-rubypowers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses highly coercive and absolute language to override default AI behavior, stating that using the skills is 'not negotiable' and 'not optional' even if there is a '1% chance' they apply. It explicitly commands the agent to treat the 'Default system prompt' as the 'lowest priority' and to override it whenever conflicts occur. This is a deliberate attempt to bypass or demote the platform's standard operational constraints in favor of the skill's own rules.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill acts as a gatekeeper for all user interactions, meaning it is the first point of processing for potentially untrusted user data which it then uses to decide which other powerful tools to invoke.
- Ingestion points: All user messages and requests received at the start of a conversation (as described in the 'The Rule' section of
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not suggest any specific delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when evaluating user input for skill relevance.
- Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent toward tools for file modification (
Write,Edit), shell command execution (Bash,run_shell_command), and subagent creation (Agent,spawn_agent,task) depending on the platform. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing user-provided text before it influences the agent's planning or tool selection logic.
Audit Metadata