ce-commit-push-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands (
git,gh,mktemp) to interact with the repository and GitHub. These are expected for a version control automation skill and are implemented with safety considerations (e.g., using quoted sentinels in heredocs to prevent variable expansion). - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile uses the!syntax to execute shell commands at load time to gather repository state (status, diff, branch, log, PR state). These commands are limited to read-only information gathering and do not incorporate unvalidated user input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface exists because the skill processes untrusted data from
git logandgit diffto generate PR descriptions. Malicious content within a commit message or a diff could theoretically attempt to influence the agent's output. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
git diffandgit logcommands in thereferences/pr-description-writing.mdflow. - Boundary markers: The instructions guide the agent on how to interpret the diff, but do not provide explicit delimiters to separate the diff content from administrative instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
gitandghtools. - Sanitization: The skill provides instructions for the agent to escape special characters when applying titles, but does not sanitize the input diff/log content itself.
Audit Metadata