ce-demo-reel
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/capture-demo.pyuploads demo artifacts tohttps://catbox.moe/user/api.phpandhttps://litterbox.catbox.moe/resources/internals/api.php. These are public, third-party anonymous file-hosting services that are not on the whitelisted domains list, posing a risk of data exposure if sensitive information is captured. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.run()inscripts/capture-demo.pyto execute system utilities includingffmpeg,ffprobe,silicon,vhs, andcurl. The logic for these commands, particularly the VHS tape files, is generated by the agent based on its interpretation of the workspace. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs users to install several external CLI tools via Homebrew, such as
vhs,silicon, andffmpeg. It also utilizescurlto interact with external APIs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data (Ingestion points: branch names, PR titles, PR descriptions, and repository file content in
SKILL.mdStep 0) to guide its capture hypothesis. It lacks boundary markers or sanitization for this data, which then influences the execution of powerful capabilities (Capability inventory: shell command execution viavhsand network navigation viaagent-browserinSKILL.mdStep 7). An attacker could manipulate these fields to influence the agent into executing malicious sequences during the capture process.
Audit Metadata