ce-sessions
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Exposure of sensitive local conversation history. The skill discovers and reads session logs from
~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/sessions, and~/.cursor/projects. These files contain private technical discussions and may inadvertently include credentials or personal data shared during previous agent interactions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local script execution and dynamic context injection.
- Orchestrates a pipeline using
bashandpython3to run internal extraction scripts (discover-sessions.sh,extract-metadata.py, etc.) on the user's file system. - Uses dynamic context injection (
!git rev-parse ...) inSKILL.mdto automatically execute shell commands for environment resolution when the skill is loaded. - Risk of command injection: The skill derives keywords from user input and appends them to shell command arguments in the discovery pipeline.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection via session history processing.
- Ingestion points: Reads arbitrary text from previous session files (via
extract-skeleton.pyandextract-errors.py) which may contain untrusted data or malicious instructions from past interactions. - Boundary markers: Lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' prompts when passing extracted history content to the synthesis subagent (
ce-session-historian.md). - Capability inventory: The
ce-session-historian.mdpersona can read and grep files, while the orchestrator uses shell commands. - Sanitization: Extraction scripts strip some system tags but do not sanitize natural language content for adversarial prompt patterns.
Audit Metadata