prepare-app-icons
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/edit_artwork.pyscript usessubprocess.run()to execute commands defined in an external JSON configuration file.\n - The
custom_editfunction retrieves a command array from a user-specified adapter configuration and executes it on the system.\n - This mechanism allows for the execution of arbitrary binaries or scripts provided in the configuration.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a "Custom command bridge" that facilitates the runtime execution of external tools.\n
- The
load_customfunction dynamically reads a JSON object to configure the command-line arguments for the bridge.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Thescripts/edit_artwork.pyscript performs network requests to interface with well-known AI services including OpenAI, Google Gemini, and xAI Grok.\n - The script also downloads generated image assets from URLs returned in the API responses from these providers.\n
- These operations are restricted to HTTPS and do not forward API credentials to the image hosting domains.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of user-supplied prompts and images for AI-assisted editing.\n
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts and image paths are passed via a JSON request file to the
edit_artwork.pyscript.\n - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to isolate user content within the provider prompts.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for command execution (
subprocess.run), network requests (urllib.request), and file system writes.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the user-supplied prompts before they are transmitted to external AI models.
Audit Metadata