jira-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell scripts and Python processes to interact with the Jira API. All user-supplied inputs, such as issue keys and JQL queries, are strictly validated using regular expressions or passed safely through Python's
jsonmodule to prevent shell injection or payload manipulation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
jira-get-attachment-content.shscript facilitates downloading files from Jira. It includes a multi-layered security approach: a 10MB file size limit, hostname validation to ensure downloads originate only from the configuredJIRA_URL(SSRF protection), and filename sanitization that strips path traversal sequences and hidden file markers. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill relies on a
.envfile for API tokens. This is managed by a custom loader (load-env.sh) that implements an allowlist for environment variable names, rejects values with control characters, and performs file permission checks to warn users if the credential file is world-readable. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an ingestion surface for untrusted data as it fetches issue descriptions and comments from Jira.
- Ingestion points: Issue content retrieved via
jira-get-issue.sh,jira-get-comments.sh,jira-get-fields-max.sh, andjira-search.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent in the raw script output; the skill relies on the agent's internal reasoning and the explicit 'READ-ONLY' constraints defined in
SKILL.md. - Capability inventory: Limited to network GET/POST requests to the Jira API and local file writes to a
tmp/directory for attachments. - Sanitization: The scripts do not interpret the content; they return structured JSON data. The risk is assessed as minimal due to the read-only nature of the tools.
Audit Metadata