skill-upstream-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data from external repositories.
- Ingestion points: Target
SKILL.mdfiles from external GitHub repositories are cloned and read during Phases 0 and 1. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit instructions to treat the ingested repository content as untrusted or to use delimiters to prevent instruction hijacking.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including
git pushto personal forks,gh pr createto upstream repositories, and arbitrarybashcommand execution. - Sanitization: Absent; the content from the external repository is analyzed to generate metrics and pull request descriptions without prior sanitization.
- Mitigation: The risk is mitigated by a mandatory Phase 5 checkpoint requiring explicit user approval of the diff and pull request body before any public action is taken.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses local shell tools for repository management and workflow automation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiple bash blocks utilizinggit(rev-parse, fetch, pull, checkout, add, commit, push) andgh(repo fork, pr create). - Context: These operations are the primary function of the skill, used to manage the contribution workflow for open-source projects.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Performs network operations to GitHub to create public pull requests.
- Evidence: Phase 6 utilizes the
ghtool to push committed changes to the user's fork and create a pull request on the original upstream repository. - Context: These actions are consistent with the skill's stated purpose; data sent externally consists of proposed skill improvements and metrics generated by the
asm evaltool.
Audit Metadata