herdr-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes multiple scripts (
badge.py,fleet_status.py,launch_profile.py,next_grid_split.py,preflight_send.py,wait_for_idle.py,broadcast.sh) that act as wrappers for theherdrCLI tool. These scripts execute shell commands usingsubprocess.runwith the array-of-arguments format, which effectively prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's design for orchestrating a fleet of agents creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, particularly during data relay and context succession.
- Ingestion points: The orchestrator agent ingests data from sub-agents using the
herdr agent readcommand in Phase 5 and processes state information via thehandoff brief templatein Phase 8 (defined inreferences/context-succession.md). - Boundary markers: While the handoff brief uses a template for organization, it lacks strict delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or sanitize embedded instructions within the relayed data.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator has the ability to execute complex sequences of commands via the
herdrCLI, including prompting agents, splitting panes, and closing windows, which could be abused if malicious instructions are ingested. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping mechanisms are implemented for the worker agent outputs before they are relayed to the user or passed to a successor agent in a handoff.
Audit Metadata