opencode-sandbox
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the Docker image
ghcr.io/luongnv89/devbox:latestfrom the author's public GitHub Container Registry to initialize the sandbox environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes several
dockerCLI commands (run, exec, cp, rm, start, inspect) to manage the container's operational state and run the OpenCode assistant inside the sandbox. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By default, the skill mounts the host's
~/.sshand~/.config/ghdirectories and injects aGH_TOKENinto the container environment. This is a documented feature enabling the agent to perform pull request and push operations. The skill explicitly provides--no-sshand--no-githubflags for users wishing to isolate the sandbox from their GitHub credentials, and it warns about the risk associated with its non-interative--automode. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation for interactive mode suggests installing or updating a helper utility (
cdev) via acurl | bashcommand targeting the author's own GitHub repository (github.com/luongnv89/docker-dev). This represents expected setup behavior for the vendor's tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an ingestion surface for untrusted data by mounting the project directory into the sandbox. Malicious instructions embedded in project files could theoretically be processed by the OpenCode agent. This risk is mitigated by the sandboxed nature of the execution and the documented isolation controls.
Audit Metadata