tad-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external files (
prd.md,idea.md,validate.md) to extract project requirements and generate documentation. This constitutes a vulnerability surface where maliciously crafted instructions embedded in these files could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
prd-readeragent reads and parsesprd.md,idea.md, andvalidate.mdat the start of the workflow. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define strict delimiters or instruction-bypass protection when passing extracted content between subagents (
prd-readertotech-researchertotad-writer). - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files (
tad.md,README.md), perform git operations (pull, rebase, push), and execute a specific local Python script if present in the user's repository. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the input document content is mentioned in the instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands for repository management and validation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes shell blocks for git synchronization:git fetch,git pull --rebase,git stash, andgit push. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdPhase 6 mentions runningpython3 scripts/update_readme_ideas_index.pyif the script exists in the user's repository. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdEdge Cases mentions validating Mermaid syntax usingmmdc -i tad.md -o /tmp/check.svg. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (
docs/README.md) provides instructions for humans to install the skill using external package managers. - Evidence: Mentions
npx skills addandasm installtargeting GitHub repositories for installation.
Audit Metadata