tmux-agent-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill monitors and relays output from worker agents running in tmux sessions. This data enters the agent context and could potentially contain malicious instructions from a compromised or adversarial worker agent designed to influence the orchestrator.
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from tmux panes using
capture-panevia thescripts/wait_for_idle.pyandscripts/broadcast.shhelpers. - Boundary markers: The orchestrator uses a split completion marker (e.g.,
TAC_DONE_$suffix) to identify the end of a worker's reply, as defined inreferences/delivery-and-waiting.md. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute
tmuxcommands, includingsend-keysto inject input into panes andkill-sessionto terminate processes. - Sanitization: The skill filters captured content to identify new lines (
new_linesfunction inscripts/wait_for_idle.py) but does not perform content-based sanitization of instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing
tmuxcommands and helper scripts to perform its functions. This involves extensive use of shell execution and Python subprocess calls. - Evidence:
scripts/preflight_send.pyandscripts/wait_for_idle.pyusesubprocess.runto call thetmuxbinary for session inspection and pane capture. - Evidence:
scripts/broadcast.shusestmux send-keysto dispatch messages to multiple agents concurrently. - Evidence:
references/tmux-recipes.mdprovides shell command patterns for resolving script paths and spawning new tmux sessions with specific agent commands.
Audit Metadata