skills/luspace1/skill-sync-conversations-antigravity/sync-conversations-antigravity/Gen Agent Trust Hub
sync-conversations-antigravity
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool relies on the
subprocessmodule to invoke thesshbinary for connection testing and executing commands on remote development machines. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: To manage data synchronization without external dependencies like 'tar', the script generates and executes Python code snippets on the remote host via
ssh <host> python3 -c '...'. This allows arbitrary code execution on the target machine. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs bidirectional transfer of application data, including SQLite databases and history logs, over the network via SSH tunnels.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The synchronization process includes the
installation_idfile. According to the skill documentation, this ID is used by the backend to associate workspaces and maintain session connections. Transferring this identifier between machines exposes session authentication data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It instructs the agent to read and 'resolve' conversation titles from the
history.jsonlfile, which can be populated with untrusted data from a remote machine. There are no boundary markers or sanitization processes to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in conversation titles or history entries. - Ingestion points:
history.jsonlis loaded and its content is inspected by the agent to find matching conversations. - Boundary markers: None. The agent is simply told to inspect the history to resolve titles.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute remote commands via SSH and write files to the local system.
- Sanitization: None observed for the content displayed to or processed by the AI agent.
Audit Metadata