lit-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from several well-known academic and scientific service domains, including OpenAlex, NCBI (PubMed), Europe PMC, arXiv, Crossref, and Zenodo. These operations are essential to the skill's primary function of literature retrieval.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
install.shscript executescurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh. This pattern downloads and executes the installer for 'uv', a well-known and widely used Python package manager from Astral. As a well-known utility, this is considered a safe installation practice for this skill's ecosystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes several subprocess calls to manage its environment:
- Invokes the
uvCLI to run thelitsearch utility. - In
src/litsearch/screen_host.py, it invokes theclaudeCLI viaasyncio.create_subprocess_execto support local model screening when an API key is not provided. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (titles and abstracts) fetched from external academic APIs and passes them to an LLM for relevance screening in
src/litsearch/screen_runner.py. - Ingestion points: Data enters the system via
src/litsearch/sources/*.pythrough various API endpoints. - Boundary markers: Prompts use Markdown headers (e.g.,
### key: ...) to delimit records, and specific instructions insrc/litsearch/screen.pydefine the screening logic. - Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network access and file writing within the project run directory.
- Sanitization:
src/litsearch/normalize.pyincludes aclean_textfunction that removes HTML tags and collapses whitespace, providing a basic layer of sanitization for ingested metadata.
Audit Metadata