prune
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill renders untrusted workflow data obtained from the environment into its user-facing output. If this metadata contains malicious instructions, the agent could potentially be influenced when processing the candidate table or during the confirmation prompt.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the output of
exarchos:exarchos_orchestrateandexarchos:exarchos_viewtools. - Boundary markers: No boundary delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are present in the rendering logic for the candidate table.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing state-modifying actions through the
exarchos:exarchos_orchestratetool. - Sanitization: The instructions do not mandate sanitization or escaping of the dynamically loaded workflow identifiers.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational logic depends on the backend server executing shell commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) andgitfor safeguard evaluations, as specified in the 'Prerequisites' and 'Safeguards Explained' sections of the skill file.
Audit Metadata