academic-letter-architect

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, specifically candidate CVs, resumes, and personal statements, to inform the recommendation letter drafting process.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the context-gathering phase described in SKILL.md and resources/methodology.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the agent when processing these external documents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's primary capability is text generation and analysis, which could be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the source data.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit requirements for sanitizing or validating the content of the external candidate documents before they are used in the prompt interpolation process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 02:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — academic-letter-architect