python
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to treat the
pyproject.tomlfile as the primary source of truth for project configuration. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, where a malicious project configuration could override agent behavior or influence its decision-making during development tasks (e.g., by manipulating linting rules, test execution parameters, or build settings). \n - Ingestion points: The agent reads
pyproject.toml,uv.lock, and various Python source files to determine project state (SKILL.md, references/uv-projects.md). \n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit warnings to disregard potentially malicious configuration settings or comments embedded in these files. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools like
uv run,pytest,ruff, andmypywhich can execute code or change project structure based on the ingested configuration (SKILL.md, references/ruff.md). \n - Sanitization: No explicit validation or sanitization steps are defined for the project configuration data before it influences the agent's workflow. \n\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides environment setup instructions that include downloading and executing an installation script for the
uvtool. \n - Evidence:
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh(SKILL.md). \n - Analysis: The download targets
astral.sh, which is the official and well-known provider for theuvandrufftoolchain. This represents standard setup procedure for these tools.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata