game-assets
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands that unsafely interpolate variables from external data sources. For example,
integration-patterns.mdcontains the instructioncurl -o public/assets/meme-ref.png "<image_url>"which uses animage_urlfromthread.json. Similarly,character-pipeline.mdspecifiesnode scripts/build-character.mjs "<Full Name>"using a name from web search results. These patterns are vulnerable to command injection if the inputs contain shell metacharacters such as backticks or subshell markers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow depends on downloading assets from several external domains. This includes public asset repositories like
kenney.nl,opengameart.org, anditch.io, as well as arbitrary URLs found during web searches or provided in context files likethread.json. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The combination of unsafe command interpolation and external data ingestion creates a surface for remote code execution. An attacker could provide a malicious string in
thread.jsonor influence web search results to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Mandatory Evidence Chain for Indirect Prompt Injection surface: (1) Ingestion points:
thread.json(image_urlfield) and web search results (personality photos). (2) Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are present. (3) Capability inventory: The skill usescurlfor networking andnodeto execute local scripts that interact with the file system. (4) Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external input strings is specified before they are used in shell commands.
Audit Metadata