worldlabs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill directs the agent to read and source the sensitive
.envfile using the commandsgrep -q '^WORLDLABS_API_KEY=.' .envandset -a; . .env; set +a. This practice exposes all environment variables and credentials stored within the file to the shell session and any subsequent commands, representing a significant data exposure risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Node.js script
scripts/worldlabs-generate.mjsto perform core logic. Because the script's source code is not included in the manifest, its operations on the local file system and network cannot be verified. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@sparkjsdev/sparkpackage from the npm registry and connects to theapi.worldlabs.aiexternal domain to facilitate its 3D generation features. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: User-provided
promptandimagearguments passed to the CLI script. \n - Boundary markers: None; the instructions do not provide delimiters or safety warnings for processing untrusted external content. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, access the network, and write to the local file system. \n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of user inputs before they are interpolated into command-line arguments. Additionally, there is a metadata discrepancy between the author 'OpusGameLabs' and the expected developer context 'M4cs'.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata