cloudflare-queues
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The
.claude-plugin/plugin.jsonfile contains inconsistent and poisoned metadata that does not align with the provided author context. - The
authorfield lists 'Jeremy Dawes' and therepositorypoints to 'https://github.com/jezweb/claude-skills', both of which contradict the skill author identity 'ma1orek'. - The
descriptionfield is poisoned with raw code snippets and ends abruptly, which can mislead automated processing of the skill metadata. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides templates for consumer Workers that ingest data from external queues, creating a vulnerability surface where untrusted input could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
message.bodyobject in templates such astemplates/queues-consumer-basic.ts,templates/queues-consumer-explicit-ack.ts, andtemplates/queues-retry-with-delay.tsacts as the entry point for external data. - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the message bodies.
- Capability inventory: The templates are designed to perform sensitive operations including network requests via
fetch, database writes viaD1Database, and storage access viaKVNamespaceandR2Bucket. - Sanitization: No input validation, escaping, or schema enforcement is applied to the message content before it is processed or used in downstream operations.
Audit Metadata