jira
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes Jira issue summaries, descriptions, and comments which are external, untrusted data sources. An attacker could embed malicious instructions in a Jira ticket that the agent then processes. \n
- Ingestion points: Issue details retrieved via
jira issue view(CLI) ormcp__atlassian__getJiraIssue(MCP) inSKILL.mdandreferences/mcp.md. \n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within ticket data, although it does mandate manual approval for most actions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell command execution (
jiraCLI), file reading/writing, and network operations via MCP tools. \n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of fetched ticket content is described. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides instructions for reading local files and writing to temporary directories. \n
- The
jira issue createandjira issue comment addcommands inreferences/commands.mdsupport a--templateflag for reading files from the local filesystem. This capability could be abused to read sensitive files if a malicious path is provided. \n - The CLI workflow in
references/commands.mdincludes writing multi-line content to/tmp/jira_body.md, which is a shared temporary directory. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing thejiraCLI and a bundled script located at~/.claude/skills/jira/jira-link-issuesas described inreferences/mcp.md. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing thejira-clitool from the well-known GitHub repositoryankitpokhrel/jira-cliusing the Homebrew package manager.
Audit Metadata