ask-matt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
/wizardcommand generates interactive bash scripts intended for infrastructure provisioning and secret configuration. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains the instruction: "Il génère un script bash interactif qui ouvre chaque URL, capture chaque valeur et l'écrit dans les secrets .env et GitHub". - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
/researchcommand performs network operations by delegating reading tasks to background agents that fetch information from external primary sources. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdstates: "délègue les tâches de lecture à un agent d'arrière-plan : il étudie une question par rapport aux sources primaires". - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages the lifecycle of sensitive credentials (tokens, secrets) by capturing them during interactive sessions and persisting them to local
.envfiles and remote GitHub secrets. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdidentifies the capability to "capture chaque valeur et l'écrit dans les secrets .env et GitHub". - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its role in processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources via the
/researchtool and from user-provided bug reports or feature requests through the/triageworkflow inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There is an absence of explicit boundary markers, delimiters, or system-level instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to generate and execute shell scripts (
/wizard), write persistent files (ADRs,CONTEXT.md, and environment files), and access the network for information retrieval. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external research data or triage inputs is described before the information is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata