internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions create a surface for indirect prompt injection by directing the agent to ingest and summarize untrusted data from various communication tools.
- Ingestion points: In
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.md, the agent is instructed to read content from Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or provide directives to ignore embedded instructions found within the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is given broad read access to organizational communication platforms and is tasked with writing formatted summaries (newsletters, status updates, FAQs) intended for internal distribution.
- Sanitization: Absent. No mechanisms for filtering, escaping, or validating content retrieved from external tools are mentioned in the skill instructions.
Audit Metadata