pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) which is written to a temporary file, compiled at runtime usinggcc, and then injected into the LibreOffice (soffice) execution environment using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique is used to intercept and redirect system calls to allow the application to function in restricted or sandboxed environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses
subprocess.runto execute external system utilities. These includegccfor runtime compilation inscripts/office/soffice.py,sofficeandpdftoppmfor document conversion inscripts/thumbnail.py, andgit difffor comparing document changes inscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdandpptxgenjs.mdspecifies dependencies on external packages from official registries. - Evidence: Instructions to
pip install Pillowandnpm install -g pptxgenjs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides the ability to extract text from user-supplied PowerPoint files, which is then processed by the agent. This ingestion of untrusted data creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
extract-textcommand inSKILL.mdextracts text from.pptxfiles provided as input. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are used when passing extracted content to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read/write to the file system and execute shell commands via
subprocess.runacross multiple scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the text extracted from documents.
Audit Metadata