superpowers-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator identifies and utilizes 'Desktop Commander' as an available connector, which provides capabilities for local file system access, terminal operations, and process management.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill architecture is designed to aggregate data from highly sensitive personal and business services (including Gmail, Google Drive, QuickBooks, and iMessage) and pass this data into a processing chain of other skills. This creates a pipeline where sensitive information is moved between potentially untrusted skill contexts.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from external connectors and local skill files which it then follows as instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
SKILL.mdfiles in theavailable_skillsdirectory and live data streams from MCP connectors (Gmail, Drive, Notion, Wix, etc.). - Boundary markers: The orchestration logic does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing data between execution phases.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses broad capabilities including file reading (via the
viewtool), script execution ('run bundled scripts'), and terminal access (via 'Desktop Commander'). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of ingested external content before it is interpolated into the prompts of subsequent skills in the chain.
Audit Metadata