superpowers-orchestrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator identifies and utilizes 'Desktop Commander' as an available connector, which provides capabilities for local file system access, terminal operations, and process management.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill architecture is designed to aggregate data from highly sensitive personal and business services (including Gmail, Google Drive, QuickBooks, and iMessage) and pass this data into a processing chain of other skills. This creates a pipeline where sensitive information is moved between potentially untrusted skill contexts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from external connectors and local skill files which it then follows as instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via SKILL.md files in the available_skills directory and live data streams from MCP connectors (Gmail, Drive, Notion, Wix, etc.).
  • Boundary markers: The orchestration logic does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing data between execution phases.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses broad capabilities including file reading (via the view tool), script execution ('run bundled scripts'), and terminal access (via 'Desktop Commander').
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of ingested external content before it is interpolated into the prompts of subsequent skills in the chain.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 05:19 PM