co-founder-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Ruby script (
scripts/graph-audit) as a final step in the setup and migration processes to ensure vault consistency. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 6: "Runscripts/graph-auditacross the complete fresh or migrated vault." - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The agent is directed to create a script file in the user's environment and explicitly modify its file permissions to be executable.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 5: "Copyreferences/graph-auditinto it byte-for-byte asscripts/graph-auditand preserve executable mode (or set it where the filesystem supports executable bits)." - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a standard architecture for ingesting data from an external "inbox" directory, creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in documents could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
raw/inbox/directory, intended for Articles, transcripts, and exports, as specified inreferences/vault-scaffold.md. - Boundary markers: The system mandates the use of
Founder-stated: unverifiedlabels and[unverified]markers in content bodies to distinguish between stated and verified data, as detailed inreferences/CONVENTIONS-core.md. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to read/write files throughout the vault structure and execute shell commands via the
graph-auditscript. - Sanitization: Content is fingerprinted using SHA-256 for idempotency, but there is no explicit validation of content safety before it is added to the agent's context, as noted in
references/CONVENTIONS-inbox-ledger.md.
Audit Metadata