agentbox-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly inform the agent that it can use
sudoto execute commands as root within the sandbox environment.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes theagentbox-ctl checkpointcommand to persist the state of the sandbox's writable layer, which captures all filesystem changes made by the agent.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes mechanisms (carry:andagentbox-ctl cp) to move files from the host machine into the sandbox. Examples provided include potentially sensitive data like~/.claude(which may contain authentication tokens) and files from~/secrets/.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it instructs the agent to parse and act upon untrusted project files.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion points: Manifest files in/workspacesuch aspackage.json,pyproject.toml,Makefile, anddocker-compose.yaml.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Boundary markers: None provided; the agent is not instructed to use delimiters or ignore instructions found in these files.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Capability inventory: Root access viasudo, writing configuration files, and state persistence viacheckpoint.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Sanitization: None; the agent uses extracted data directly to generate the system configuration.
Audit Metadata