absolute-brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Companion check) direct the agent to execute a shell command (ls) on user-level directories such as~/.claude/skills/,~/.agent/skills/, and others to identify existing installations of recommended skills. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Both the
README.mdandSKILL.md(Companion check) suggest the installation of the skill and its dependencies from theAbsolutelySkilledGitHub repository using thenpx skills addcommand. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of the
npx skills addcommand for installation and skill management involves downloading and executing logic from a remote source (github.com/AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core functionality involves reading and processing untrusted data from the local codebase to inform its reasoning.
- Ingestion points: The 'Deep Context Scan' (Phase 1) and 'Codebase-First Intelligence' (Phase 2) in
SKILL.mdreadREADME.md,CLAUDE.md,CONTRIBUTING.md, and other files in thedocs/directory. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are provided in the skill instructions to prevent the agent from following directions embedded within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read any file, search the codebase, and initiate a sub-agent review process (Phase 8).
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from the codebase before it is integrated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata