absolute-brainstorm

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md (Companion check) direct the agent to execute a shell command (ls) on user-level directories such as ~/.claude/skills/, ~/.agent/skills/, and others to identify existing installations of recommended skills.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Both the README.md and SKILL.md (Companion check) suggest the installation of the skill and its dependencies from the AbsolutelySkilled GitHub repository using the npx skills add command.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of the npx skills add command for installation and skill management involves downloading and executing logic from a remote source (github.com/AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core functionality involves reading and processing untrusted data from the local codebase to inform its reasoning.
  • Ingestion points: The 'Deep Context Scan' (Phase 1) and 'Codebase-First Intelligence' (Phase 2) in SKILL.md read README.md, CLAUDE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, and other files in the docs/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are provided in the skill instructions to prevent the agent from following directions embedded within these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read any file, search the codebase, and initiate a sub-agent review process (Phase 8).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from the codebase before it is integrated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 15, 2026, 08:46 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — absolute-brainstorm