absolute-deflake
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that attempt to control the AI's output style and persona, specifically requiring the response to start with a "๐งช" emoji and for the AI to "Respond terse like smart caveman" except for security warnings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various testing and linting tools via shell commands, including
npm test,pytest,go test, andmake lint. These are used to empirically detect flakiness and verify fixes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the user's home directory to read configuration from
~/.absolute/config.json. While used for codebase conventions, accessing the home directory is a sensitive file operation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Test execution outputs, CI history logs, and repository configuration files (
.absolute.config.json) inreferences/health-engine.md(Step 1 & 2). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from obeying instructions that might be embedded within test failures or log files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can modify project source code (FIX step) and execute arbitrary project scripts (VERIFY step) through subprocesses.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering is present for the data read from external tools or history logs before it is used to generate code fixes.
Audit Metadata