absolute-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: The skill follows a well-defined, lightweight workflow for generating design specifications. It operates by reading local codebase context and writing the resulting document to a specific directory (
docs/plans/). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs read-only operations such as scanning for project conventions, reading manifests, and checking recent commit history (last 10–20 commits). It does not execute arbitrary shell commands or perform high-risk system modifications.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: There is no evidence of network communication or data being sent to external endpoints. The skill's operations are confined to the local filesystem.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include a specific "smart caveman" response style for the agent. This is a stylistic constraint and does not attempt to bypass safety filters or ignore system-level instructions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill reads untrusted data from the local repository during the SCAN phase (Step 1), including
README.md,CLAUDE.md, documentation files, and recent commit messages. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the content of these scanned files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local filesystem and interact with the user via questions. It is explicitly prohibited from performing
git commitactions. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the ingested repository content is performed before the agent synthesizes it into a design spec.
- Risk: A malicious actor could place instructions in a commit message or a README file that might influence the agent's behavior during the design phase, although the impact is limited by the skill's restricted capabilities.
Audit Metadata