super-brainstorm

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run an automated shell command (ls) targeting several hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g., ~/.claude/skills/, ~/.agent/skills/) to identify other installed companion skills upon first activation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Employs highly assertive behavioral overrides using 'HARD-GATE' and 'MUST' directives to strictly enforce a multi-phase workflow and ensure the agent stays in 'plan mode' until design approval.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection by instructing the agent to ingest and reason over large volumes of untrusted data from the local codebase.
  • Ingestion points: Phase 1 ('Deep context scan') reads project files such as README.md, CLAUDE.md, and all files in the docs/ directory. Phase 2 ('Codebase-First Intelligence') uses grep and glob to scan the entire codebase for context before asking questions.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters (like XML tags or markdown blocks) or provide 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data being read.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses file system read/write capabilities (writing design specs to docs/plans/), shell execution (ls, grep, glob), and the ability to trigger subagents for 'Spec Review' loops.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of content filtering or validation for the data retrieved from the codebase before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 10:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — super-brainstorm