super-brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run an automated shell command (
ls) targeting several hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/,~/.agent/skills/) to identify other installed companion skills upon first activation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Employs highly assertive behavioral overrides using 'HARD-GATE' and 'MUST' directives to strictly enforce a multi-phase workflow and ensure the agent stays in 'plan mode' until design approval.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection by instructing the agent to ingest and reason over large volumes of untrusted data from the local codebase.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 ('Deep context scan') reads project files such as
README.md,CLAUDE.md, and all files in thedocs/directory. Phase 2 ('Codebase-First Intelligence') usesgrepandglobto scan the entire codebase for context before asking questions. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters (like XML tags or markdown blocks) or provide 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data being read.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses file system read/write capabilities (writing design specs to
docs/plans/), shell execution (ls, grep, glob), and the ability to trigger subagents for 'Spec Review' loops. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of content filtering or validation for the data retrieved from the codebase before it is processed by the agent.
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