claude-devfleet
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to its orchestration design.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
get_reporttool, which reads output from sub-agents as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack defined delimiters or specific prompts to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded within sub-agent reports.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrating agent has the ability to manage and dispatch missions using tools like
dispatch_missionandcreate_mission. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external agent reports.
Audit Metadata