claude-devfleet

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to its orchestration design.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the get_report tool, which reads output from sub-agents as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack defined delimiters or specific prompts to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded within sub-agent reports.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrating agent has the ability to manage and dispatch missions using tools like dispatch_mission and create_mission.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external agent reports.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 26, 2026, 07:57 PM