configure-ecc
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones a remote repository from an untrusted GitHub account (
affaan-m/everything-claude-code) to the/tmpdirectory. - Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/affaan-m/everything-claude-code.git /tmp/everything-claude-codeinSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to manipulate the file system, including removing directories, creating paths, and copying files.
- Evidence: Uses
rm -rf,mkdir -p, andcp -rthroughout the installation steps inSKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By copying downloaded content from an untrusted source directly into the agent's configuration directories (
~/.claude/skillsand~/.claude/rules), the skill effectively installs unverified instructions that define the agent's future behavior and capabilities. - Evidence: Step 2d and Step 3 describe copying remote skills and rules into the active
.claudepath. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
grepto scan for sensitive path references (like~/.claude/) within the installed files, which can expose local environment details to the agent context. - Evidence:
grep -rn "~/.claude/" $TARGET/skills/ $TARGET/rules/in Step 4b.
Audit Metadata