prd-to-tasks
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [OBFUSCATION]: Detection of homoglyph substitution in documentation placeholders.\n
- Evidence: The placeholder
<prд-mentioned-symbol>inSKILL.mduses the Cyrillic character 'д' (U+0434) instead of the Latin 'd'.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to analyze the codebase and retrieve documents.\n - Evidence: Invokes
grep,find, andlark-cliacross several phases (Phase 1.0 and Phase 2 inSKILL.md).\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from processed PRDs.\n - Ingestion points: PRD content from Lark/Feishu URLs, pasted text, and local files (Phase 0 and 1.0 in
SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Includes
<HARD-GATE>sections requiring explicit human approval strings to proceed.\n - Capability inventory: Performs file reads/writes and codebase-wide searching via shell commands.\n
- Sanitization: Relies on human-in-the-loop review rather than automated input sanitization.\n- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: Performs network requests to fetch external documentation.\n
- Evidence: Uses
lark-clito fetch data from well-known servicesfeishu.cnandlark.cn(Phase 1.0 inSKILL.md).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata