spec-writer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and processes multiple local files including configuration (
.spec-superflow.yaml), templates (templates/spec.md), and existing planning artifacts (proposal.md,specs/,design.md,tasks.md). These files represent an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded by external actors or compromised dependencies. - Ingestion points:
.spec-superflow.yaml,proposal.md,specs/,design.md,tasks.md,templates/spec.md(as specified in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands via the
ssf(Spec Superflow) CLI tool (ssf runtime config,ssf state set,ssf state transition). - Sanitization: No sanitization logic is defined for the content extracted from artifacts before it is used in CLI command arguments.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ssfcommand-line utility for project state management and configuration. It specifically instructs the agent to construct commands likessf state set <change-dir> dp_2_result "approved: <summary>". If the generated<summary>contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons) derived from malicious project files, it could lead to command injection within the local environment.
Audit Metadata