spec-writer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and processes multiple local files including configuration (.spec-superflow.yaml), templates (templates/spec.md), and existing planning artifacts (proposal.md, specs/, design.md, tasks.md). These files represent an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded by external actors or compromised dependencies.
  • Ingestion points: .spec-superflow.yaml, proposal.md, specs/, design.md, tasks.md, templates/spec.md (as specified in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands via the ssf (Spec Superflow) CLI tool (ssf runtime config, ssf state set, ssf state transition).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic is defined for the content extracted from artifacts before it is used in CLI command arguments.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the ssf command-line utility for project state management and configuration. It specifically instructs the agent to construct commands like ssf state set <change-dir> dp_2_result "approved: <summary>". If the generated <summary> contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons) derived from malicious project files, it could lead to command injection within the local environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 04:26 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — spec-writer