infsh-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/authentication.mddirect the user to execute a remote script usingcurl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern is a high-risk vector for executing arbitrary code from an unverified external source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binary executables from
dist.inference.shduring the installation process. While the documentation mentions SHA-256 verification and Sigstore signatures, the initial script used to facilitate this is fetched from an unverified remote domain. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions in
references/cli-reference.mdfor shell completions (e.g.,belt completion bash > /etc/bash_completion.d/infsh) involve writing to system-level directories. This typically requires elevated privileges (sudo) and can be used to achieve persistence or modify system behavior. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
beltCLI tool features automatic local file uploads. As documented inreferences/running-apps.md, providing a local file path (e.g.,/path/to/photo.jpgor~/.ssh/id_rsaif misused) to the--inputargument results in the file being uploaded to theinference.shcloud infrastructure. This creates a significant data exposure surface if the agent is prompted to process sensitive local files.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata