skills/magentosh/skills/infsh-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

infsh-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions in SKILL.md and references/authentication.md direct the user to execute a remote script using curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern is a high-risk vector for executing arbitrary code from an unverified external source.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binary executables from dist.inference.sh during the installation process. While the documentation mentions SHA-256 verification and Sigstore signatures, the initial script used to facilitate this is fetched from an unverified remote domain.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions in references/cli-reference.md for shell completions (e.g., belt completion bash > /etc/bash_completion.d/infsh) involve writing to system-level directories. This typically requires elevated privileges (sudo) and can be used to achieve persistence or modify system behavior.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The belt CLI tool features automatic local file uploads. As documented in references/running-apps.md, providing a local file path (e.g., /path/to/photo.jpg or ~/.ssh/id_rsa if misused) to the --input argument results in the file being uploaded to the inference.sh cloud infrastructure. This creates a significant data exposure surface if the agent is prompted to process sensitive local files.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 23, 2026, 06:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — infsh-cli